Introduction
In Pakistan, the frequent and often arbitrary use of Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 1898, to curb protests and public assemblies had sparked criticism about its misuse. While originally intended as an emergency measure to preempt threats to public order, this provision has increasingly been used as a political tool to suppress dissent, disrupt opposition activities, and stifle civic engagements. This opinion will discuss the misuse of this section and its effect on constitutional rights and democratic principles.
Framework and Scope of Section 144
Originally designed to address urgent situations like riots, natural disasters, communal tensions, or sectarian violence like riots or during Muharram. This provision was meant to address urgent situations where public safety is at risks, such as during riots, natural disasters, communal tensions, or sectarian violence, the lack of precise definition and limitations on its scope leaves room for a discretionary and sometimes arbitrary application. This discretionary nature of s.144 often leads to its exploitation as a tool for repression and suppression of constitutional rights like the right to peaceful assembly and the right to form association.
Impact on Political Rights and Democratic Participation
One of the most glaring issues with s.144 is its frequent use to suppress political opposition. Governments have imposed it during opposition-led protests, marches, or sit-ins, citing public concerns while effectively silencing opposition. For, example, in January 2024, this provision was enforced when Imran Khan called on PTI candidates to organize public meetings. The enforcement led to widespread criticism from civil society and political analysts, who argued that the decision undermined democratic practices. It also created a sense of fear among organizers and participants, curtailing broader political engagement and signaling the state’s intolerance of dissent.
Similarly, in July 2024 when PTI leader Asad Qaiser and leader of TTAP, Mehmood Khan announced a protest demanding the release of political prisoner, the Punjab Home Department invoked s.144 citing vague reasons that such protests would provide a “soft target” to terrorists and pose “serious security threats.” Recently, s.144 was imposed amidst PTI’s protest notification on November 24 with roads blocked with containers and almost 1,500 police officers being deployed under the supervision of Rawalpindi’s RPO. This shows how such vague and discretionary provisions are often wielded as a weapon against political adversaries, undermining the principle of fair and free political competition.
The misuse of s.144 also impacts public confidence in their ability to exercise their democratic right. Fear of arrest, police brutality, use of tear gas and shelling discourages ordinary citizens from participating in protests, even for legitimate causes. This chilling effect on civic engagement disproportionally affects marginalized groups who already face barriers to political participation.
The broad nature of s.144 often results in the imposition of measures tantamount to collective punishment. General prohibitions such as a blanket ban on public gatherings or the imposition of curfew often extend to cutting off mobile services and the internet extending their impact beyond targeting indicial or groups, adversely affecting workers, businesses, and students. Consequently, this overbroad application of s.144 demands judicial scrutiny to prevent its arbitrary use.
International and Judicial Perspectives
The right to peaceful assembly is recognized as a fundamental right under Article 21 of ICCPR which requires restriction to be imposed only where “it is necessary in the interest of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Restrictions imposed under s.144 often fail to meet these requirements of necessity leading to their frequent use for political objectives. Courts and human rights organizations have emphasized the need for judicial oversights restricting public gatherings. The Supreme Court of India in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (2020) held that restrictions like those under s.144 must be based on concrete evidence, limited in scope, and should be subjected to judicial oversight. This principle resonates strongly in Pakistan, where similar judicial intervention could help mitigate the discretionary and often politically motivated use of Section 144, ensuring its application aligns with constitutional safeguards.
ECHR has mandated that any restriction on assembly must be “necessary in a democratic society.” In Pakistan, courts have frequently echoed these principles. For instance, the Lahore High Court has criticized its use and upon application from a petitioner, Justice Ahmad Nadeem Arshad even sought a response from the provincial government on the reason for imposing these orders. However, this intervention remains sporadic as the action was taken only upon the filing of a petition and this deficiency raises concern about the protection of fundamental rights and adherence to constitutional principles calling for establishing guidelines for its use.
Recommendations to avoid misuse of s.144
To address and curb the misuse of this provision, comprehensive guidelines, and limitations should be addressed to necessitate its need. The government should establish clear and objective criteria for invoking s.144, ensuring it is limited to genuine emergencies where public safety and national interest are at risk. Judicial oversight is also crucial to ensure such orders comply with constitutional principles and international standards. Additionally, fostering dialogues with protest organizers can offer a constructive alternative to imposing blanket bans, enabling grievances to be addressed without undermining civic freedoms. Moreover, independent bodies can also be tasked to monitor its use and oversee it, ensuring transparency and accountability. These measures can collectively help to curtail the frequent and often misuse of s.144 safeguarding fundamental rights.
Conclusion
The frequent misuse of section 144 CrPC poses a grave threat to democratic freedoms, silencing opposition and undermining public trust. While maintaining public order is a legitimate objective, it should not come at the cost of constitutional and international rights of freedom of assembly and association. A balanced approach grounded in judicial oversight, legal clarity, objective assessment, dialogue, and certain limitation criteria is essential to ensure that this provision serves its intended purpose rather than being weaponized for political suppression.