Beyond Symbolism: Assessing the Practical Framework of the Makkah Defence Pact

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement introduces a new chapter of considerations for Pakistan to make. The frameworks of the pact are key to the analysis of whether activation of such an alliance can be a workable prospect. The central idea of any such defence agreement can be implied to be collective security. The political institutions within Pakistan cannot be disregarded before any such alliance is made functional, in particular, the elected legislature. This article tries to assess on an evaluative scale whether such an alliance would serve Pakistan’s interest beyond its symbolic significance. It is an attempt to apprehend, on the basis of historical, political and strategic trends, the possibility of sustainable outcomes for Pakistan as an active member of this trilateral defence agreement.

It would rather not be irrational to draw our inference from the past, when it comes to the significance of Parliament in issues pertaining to national security and military deployments to honour international commitments. In 2015, the Parliament took a view of neutrality to Saudi Arabia’s request for support. In 2018, Senator Farhatullah Babar raised concerns over the deployment of troops abroad in the upper house, calling it an issue of public importance. Perhaps it would not be an overstatement to say that the unity of the Muslim ummah extends beyond the three countries of Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This also reflects ambiguity on the future members of this agreement, if any, and whether Pakistan’s diplomatic interests would be best served by such additional cooperation. These are policy decisions that require the foresight of the country’s long-term diplomatic aims rather than the short-lived zeal for unity.

The vagueness of the pact itself can be reviewed to analyse its future growth. We are able to infer, upon closer reflection, that the driving motive is collective deterrence. Although it mirrors Article 5 of NATO, no certain provisions were published upon the initial signing. With the regional optics in due regard, it is safe to say that the theme is capacity building rather than an advancement of any aggressive aims by the three countries. The hypothesis is based on the intricate interplay of interests that the member countries have established internationally.

Pakistan takes rightful pride in its role as a peacemaker between Washington and Tehran, as Islamabad hosted talks for a ceasefire to the international conflict earlier this year. The tensions between Riyadh and Tehran leave Pakistan’s standing in a delicate spot. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would want to give effect to the pact after an attack on its infrastructure on the 5th of October, for which it claims the Houthis to be responsible. Pakistan had promised to support Saudi Arabia even though, in its current state of affairs, exclusively armed support against the Houthis may be less likely, as this risks a taint on the trust Tehran has shown in Islamabad, in its role as an impartial mediator. The spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Esmaeil Baghaei, referred to Pakistan’s enforcement of the Makkah pact against the Houthis as “rumours”, which not only demonstrates trust but also the desire for continued strengthening of regional ties between the two countries.

Pakistan also requires vigilance with the idea of deploying troops abroad to show its continued commitment to the pact. Even though Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar called the agreement defensive, without an offensive agenda, it is not hard to conclude, on nuance, that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would visualise Pakistan as a possible nuclear umbrella, however remote the practicality of such a visualisation may be. Decision makers must bear in mind the threat from arch-rival India. Despite the hero”cs of Pakistan’s air force in May 2025, the irrefutable fact is that the Indian military is superior in numbers. This reality leaves us in a dilemma of whether to stand up for our brotherly countries or be focused on keeping our own decades-long enemy at bay, which, according to the most recent statistics, has spent INR 7.85 trillion compared to Pakistan’s PKR 3 trillion for 2026-2027 on its defence budget. The implications of such a pact may, therefore, render Pakistan exposed in terms of its internal threats.

The irrefutable ground realities do assert, to an extent, that such a pact could be a workable solution for Pakistan. In times when it is uncommon to have a day without the news of inflation in general or rising fuel prices, the country would more than welcome any prospects of an economic boost. Saudi Arabia, historically, has been a substantial contributor to Pakistan’s rather feeble economy. This was evidenced earlier in the year as well, when Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb confirmed the arrival of a USD 3 billion financial support programme from Pakistan’s trilateral agreement partner. However, we must not confuse the fact that, even when it comes to national interests, priorities are a factual existence. A prosperous economy would serve little purpose in the existence of internal turmoil. The scare comes from a long-standing acrimony between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran not only shares its borders with Pakistan but has historically been an ally to the Yemeni resistance group, the Houthis. Ansar Allah remarked, as the spokesperson of the militant group, that attacks on Riyadh would continue until it ends the “financial and economic siege” on the Yemeni people. It is not hard to accept that Pakistan is a country in which sectarian divisions are much pronounced. As the expectations of members within this pact unfold, it would be worth noticing whether Pakistan has enough space to take its commitments with the Saudis at the solemn levels promised within the writings of the agreement. Undeniably, the state cannot undermine the existence of Shia Muslims within Pakistan. A pro-Saudi stance could rather easily be calculated as an anti-Iranian one. We should not be forgetful of the exchanges in 2024, when, reportedly, an Iranian missile targeted Panjgur town in Pakistan. The relationship has since improved, courtesy of the collective efforts of Pakistan’s political and military leadership. The argument to be considered here would be whether Pakistan, as a member of the pact, is willing to compromise its neatly built relations with Iran. This compromise can have internal implications. The martyrdom of Ayatollah Khamenei witnessed a sense of unity in the sectarian divisions within Pakistan. The ideal status would be building on such foundations of harmony, which is only possible if the State of Pakistan draws a fine balance in its relationship with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Turkey plays a pivotal role as an ally of Pakistan in the pact. As a NATO member whose army is the second-largest among 32 countries within the formation, it offers Pakistan the opportunity for capacity building both in manpower and in equipment in the event of a future conflict on or beyond its borders. The certainty of the outcome depends on how the relationships shape over time; however, there is a discernible hope, since Turkey has been one of the very few countries to support Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir issue in the United Nations General Assembly. This assertion, as profitable as it might seem on paper, does not override Iran’s presence in Pakistan’s neighbourhood. The landscape of such an agreement underscores the vital need to take a calculated yet confirmed stance on the international front.

Pakistan should rather not activate agreements that are procedurally ambiguous in nature. Once the state representatives become leading actors in the prospect of such international obligations, they compromise a broader national stance and foreign policy of the country. Even though the pact is to be mechanised through Parliament’s approval, becoming a signatory ahead of such activity casts a shadow on the principles of national consensus for the collective well-being of the country. It, therefore, leaves little room to accommodate an alternative view from a democratic actor merely considering the legislature as part of an already decided agreement.

Bibliography:

Explainer – Makkah pact and defence of the kingdom – https://www.dawn.com/news/2035540 

 Iran turns on Pakistan as Saudi defence pact takes effect – https://www.iranintl.com/en/202610097201 

India announces 85.5 billion defence budget for FY 2026-2027 – https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/industry/update-india-announces-usd855-billion-defence-budget-for-fy-202627 

Budget 2026-2027: Defence gets Rs 3tr amid security concerns –  https://www.dawn.com/news/2007456/budget-2026-27-defence-gets-rs3tr-amid-security-concerns-2027 

Pakistan to receive $3bn from Saudi Arabia next week – https://english.aaj.tv/news/amp/330456946 

Can Iran negotiate between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis? – https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/can-iran-negotiate-between-saudi-arabia-and-houthis 

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/makkah.htm 

Zardari calls for effectively implementing Makkah pact  – https://www.dawn.com/news/2022953 

Senator Babar raises objections over army deployment in Saudi Arabia – https://www.dawn.com/news/1389781 

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