Space Weaponization and the Legal Void

In 2025, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists announced the Doomsday Clock to be 89 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been to symbolizing global nuclear catastrophe.[1]The world of today is pacing towards the threat of an imminent nuclear winter. The Neo-realistic perspective views space primarily through the lens of military competition, with the weaponization of space emerging as the new head of the nuclear triad. Amidst these shifting global dynamics, the world appears to be moving towards a nuclear cold war with space being the new battleground. Spatial weaponization has become a pivotal concern in the current geopolitical era. The year 2023 saw the deterioration of the nuclear arms control regime marked by Russia’s suspension of NEW START- the last standing treaty between Russia and the US.[2] This shift from pan-Americanization to multi-polarity has become an epitome of the Thucydides trap. The last decade has seen the deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations. The U.S. perceives China as a strategic rival and is strictly adherent to its “Containment of China” policy with India being its front-hand ally.[3]Arms control has been undermined by the competition between major powers, driven by their desire to gain military and strategic supremacy over the planet and outer space. The world once again under the paradigm of maximization of power has started an arms race with space serving as a new arena. As space becomes more, militarized it has become imperative to look into the legal frameworks regulating the space race and weaponization.

“Spatial weaponization refers to the deployment of weapons, whether space-based or on Earth, that pose a threat to space security, interfere with peaceful uses of space, or produce destructive effects in space, whether kinetic or non-kinetic”.[4] The offensive capabilities of space weaponization could potentially add a new layer of complexity to global security dynamics.[5] For further clarity, it is pertinent to delve deep into the historical background. The first Anti-satellite (ASAT) tests were conducted during the Cold War against the USSR-launched satellite Sputnik in 1957. The U.S. considering Sputnik a threat to their nuclear deterrence with the potential to bear nuclear arms, developed Bold Orion in 1959. The first ASAT weapon with a kinetic hit-to-kill system specially designed to target low-orbit satellites. The Bold Orion was capable of transporting nuclear-based warheads and could launch from modernized aircraft jets.[6] The Soviet Union responded by starting its program in the 1960s and 1970s, which was based on research and development of ASAT weapons specifically co-orbitals.[7] It further tempted the U.S. to manufacture an air-to-surface 135 weapon (ASM-135), a kinetic energy anti-satellite (KE-ASAT) in the 1980s. Fast forward to 2007, China entered the space militarization arena with successful tests of KE-ASAT weapons, with recent ASAT weaponry capability of reaching Earth’s geostationary orbit. It opened the pathway of India, leading to the first ASAT test on 27 March 2019 which involved the use of KE-ASAT weapons to destroy a live satellite in low orbit by using a ballistic missile vehicle under “Mission Shakti”.[8] As the threat of star wars approached and militarization became a reality, the global efforts to govern outer space started aimed to provide a robust legal framework leading the nations towards peaceful use.

In the 1050s, the UNGA reaffirmed its stance regarding international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. It led to the establishment of “The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)” in 1959. The COPUOS played a pivotal role in creating “five United Nations treaties on outer space.” One of the most significant of these is “The Outer Space Treaty 1967” which serves as the cornerstone of international space law. Article IV of “The Outer Space Treaty 1967” states that “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”[9] The establishment of military bases, deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in orbit, and testing of nuclear weapons in space and celestial bodies are prohibited under it. Moreover, The Outer Space Treaty only addresses two categories of the spatial tirade, space-to-space weapons, and space-to-Earth weapons but remains silent on Earth-to-space deployment.

The Moon Agreement of 1979 sought to extend the Outer Space Treaty by playing a crucial role in prohibiting the militarization of celestial bodies, especially the Moon. Article III (3)  of The Moon Agreement explicitly stipulates that “States Parties shall not place in orbit around or on any trajectory to or around the Moon objects bearing nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, nor shall they position or utilize such weapons on or within the Moon’s surface.”[10] This provision underscores the commitment of signatory states to prevent the placement and deployment of WMDs in the lunar environment, reflecting a broader intention to maintain outer space for peaceful purposes. The major space-faring nations like The U.S., Russia, China, and  India have not ratified it leading to its failure. These nations are particularly resistant to Article 11 of the agreement that declares the Moon “a common heritage to mankind” as it implies restriction on their ability to exploit lunar resources. Moreover, the U.S. has bypassed the moon agreement by legislating the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 enabling private entities like Space X and Blue Origin to own space resources utilizing them as per their liking reflecting light on the inadequacy of practical implementation.[11]

The Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty is currently being discussed in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Under the draft treaty of PAROS submitted to CD by Russia in 2008, the state parties would refrain from placing any kind of conventional or non-conventional WMDs in orbit, installing weapons on celestial bodies, and threatening the use of force against objects in outer space.[12] On the contrary, PAROS is facing a similar deadlock in enforcement. In 1990 the United States announced that it “has not identified any practical outer space arms control measures that can be dealt with within a multilateral environment.” With its large missile defense program and technical advantages in potential space weaponry, the United States has consistently refused to negotiate PAROS in the CD.[13] Despite continuous endeavors, these measures remain inadequate. The U.S. has strongly opposed multilateral space arms control discussions, such as Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and has shown resistance to calls for further negotiations.[14]

While the above-mentioned treaties set the ground to prevent space militarization, they have a huge legal loophole. All of these treaties fail to address modern autonomous weapons. The increasing integration of AI in the military led to the development of the “Lethal Autonomous Weapon System” (LAWS). LAWS is a special class of weapon system that uses sensors and algorithms to select, track, and destroy a target without any human intervention.[15] LAWS despite being capable of performing intrinsic military operations with minimal human errors is prone to unprecedented risks, especially to cyber-attacks. The current trajectory of usage of LAWS falls within the ambit of terrestrial warfare but their utilization and deployment in orbit to date remains a blind spot in international space law. The prospect of space-based LAWS opens a new Pandora’s box of security dilemma by threatening the credible minimum deterrence of the majority of the world. The hijacking of space deployed LAWS would result in conflict escalation and unauthorized attacks pushing the world toward a nuclear war.

While the LAWS reflects the future space implications, the current ASAT weaponry demonstrates the present inadequacy of international space law. The growing ASAT technology is reflecting the need for legal interference with Russia’s Nudol ASAT(2020–2023) being its prime example. Russia’s Nudol ASAT tests highlight the shortcomings of space laws. Russia’s Nudol ASAT has played a significant role in the expansion of Russia’s air border and military capability by equipping them with the ability to destroy low-orbit satellites. The tests between 2020 and 2023 gained international attention due to their potential threat to space security and disarmament. On 11 November 2021, Russia’s successful test of Nudol, destroyed its own defunct COSMOS-1408 satellite in lower earth orbit (LEO) creating 1500 trackable debris pieces and increasing their threat of collision with the International Space Station.[16] The U.S. and NATO declared it a threat to space security. The U.S. intelligence and military pointed out that Russia is moving from KE-ASATs towards co-orbital ASAT technology.[17] It could allow them to disable satellites without direct destruction and engage in cyberwars. The Outer Space Treaty (1967) bans the placement of WMDs in orbit but does not explicitly ban ASAT testing. The Nudol test highlighted the limitations of existing treaties, particularly the absence of enforceable mechanisms to prevent destructive ASAT testing. The Nudol test has once again prompted The U.S., China, and India to further invest in ASAT capability resurfacing concerns of a space arms race. The test underscored the urgent need for a legally binding framework to prohibit destructive ASAT tests and space weaponization.

Space that was once the frontier of exploration has become a new arena for potential nuclear conflict. This rapid increase in space militarization is steering the world towards a catastrophic nuclear war. In recent advents, the development of KE-ASAT and LAWS poses a significant threat to the nuclear triad. Spatial deployment in orbits and celestial bodies will undermine nuclear deterrence, exacerbate geopolitical instability, and further accelerate the space arms race. While treaties like The Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Moon Agreement (1979), and the PAROS agreement are stepping stones toward nuclear disarmament and space governance, the existing legal loopholes have allowed spacefaring nations to increase militarization without legal implications. The recent Nudol ASAT test underscores the inadequacy of the current legal framework, revealing its failure to address modern technological advancements and the growing space security threat. The laws are unable to address the present challenges and technological advancements. In a nutshell, it is the need of time to address the legal loopholes in space governance to prevent conflicts and territorial claims, ensuring that space remains accessible to all. If the dangers of LAWS and ASAT testing remain unaddressed, their deployment lead to unprecedented security risks and territorial claims. Thus, a robust and enforceable legal framework is urgently needed to prevent space from becoming the next frontier for conflict and ensure its peaceful use for future generations.

References:

1. 2025 Doomsday Clock Statement, https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/2025-statement/ Retrieved on February 9, 2025.
2. Russia Suspends New START | Arms Control Association https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/russia-suspends-new-start
3. Panda, J. (2023, January 4). Will India and China escape the Thucydides’ trap? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/will-india-and-china-escape-the-thucydides-trap/
4. Wickramatunga. (n.d.). Outer Space Treaty. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html
5. Kenneth S. Blazejewski, “Space Weaponization and US-China Relations,” 2008, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Space-Weaponization-and-US-China-Relations Blazejewski/024b615482ef93f18c6fb23dd0e580619b3b29c2.
6. Terry White, “Bold Orion’s ASAT Mission,” White Eagle Aerospace, October 7, 2015, https://www.whiteeagleaerospace.com/bold-orions-asat-mission/
7. Talia M. Blatt, “Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Emerging Space Arms Race,” Harvard International Review, May 26, 2020, https://hir.harvard.edu/anti-satellite-weapons-and-the-emerging-space-arms-race/.
8. Ghalib, S. J. (2024, August 13). Sardar Jahanzaib Ghalib. https://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-the-weaponization-of-space-global-trends-national-perspectives-and-legal-implications/
9. Wickramatunga. (n.d.). Outer Space Treaty. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html retrieved on 26/01/2025
10. Article 3 “Moon Agreement” https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/moon-agreement.html
11. Von Der Dunk, F. (2015, December 1). The US Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015. JURIST – Commentary – Legal News & Commentary. https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2015/11/frans-vonderdunk-space-launch/
12. Currently being discussed in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
13. https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/#:~:text=PAROS%20Treaty,Background
14. NTI,Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space Treaty, Https://Www.Nti.Org/Education-Center/Treaties-and-Regimes/Proposed-Prevention-Arms-Race-Space-Paros-Treaty/
15. S. Mission Geneva, “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space Statement by Ambassador Turner,” U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, March 30, 2023, https://geneva.usmission.gov/2023/03/30/remarks-arms-race-in-outer-space-paros/.
16. Defense Primer: U.S. policy on lethal autonomous weapon systems. (2020). In CRS Reports, CRS Reports. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1121848.pdf
17. Graham, W., & Graham, W. (2021, November 15). Russia tests anti-satellite missile, debris disrupts International Space Station. NASASpaceFlight.com. https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/russia-anti-satellite-missile-debris/
18. Hitchens, T., & Hitchens, T. (2021, July 22). Russia builds new Co-Orbital satellite: SWF, CSIS say. Breaking Defense. https://breakingdefense.com/2019/04/russia-builds-new-co-orbital-satellite-swf-csis-say/