Ijtehad in Modern Times

Did the 10^th century mark the closing of the gates of Ijtihad? Ijtihad, among the Arabic words, refers to the work done by one or several members of the sacred community in exercising the faculty of reasoning and interpretation in Islamic law. It helps the scholars tackle new problems without ever losing the guidance or truth deriving from the teachings found in the Quran and Sunnah. With respect to ijtihad, the jurists are mostly concerned with arrangements for solutions within such aspects of Sharia that balance tradition and modern-day needs. Theoretically, ijtihad has provided the theoretical framework for scholars to interpret religious principles as the social and political realities developed. This gave a window to face challenges emerging while remaining rooted to the sources of Islamic Law-Quran and Sunnah. Yet others hold the belief that by the late tenth century, the practice of ijtihad was effectively abandoned and was almost immediately supplanted by taqlid: the rigid adherence to set rulings. This was the point which heated a debate among scholars, some contending that Ijtihad was never really exited from the legal sphere of Islam throughout the ages, but rather had transformed in its application. This article will trace the history of this debate and analyze whether the closure of ijtihad was abrupt or a gradual change, a pattern of legal strategy.

History of The Debate

Following the classical or the formative period of Islam, there was no debate or question about whether the scholars or the more prominent specialists of Islam could derive their ruling for a problem from the Quran or Sunnah. If anything, the hadith of the Prophet PBUH “My nation will not unite on misguidance, so if you see them differing, follow the great majority” [1] was seen in practice through Ijma, examples used till today. It was only after this, around the time of 900 AD, that a consensus was reached amongst all schools that the necessary and essential questions of law had been answered and that from that point forth no one carried the intellect or the independent reasoning required by a Mujtahid to perform ijtihad, confining all future issues and question to the word of Allah and/or the Sunnah.[2]

Allama Muhammad Iqbal utterly refuted the notion of the closed doors of ijtihad, stating that this was a misconception borne out of the rigidness of juridical thought and a kind of complacency of intellect. He argued in favor of the idea that real Islamic thought encourages continuous reinterpretation and adaptation instead of blind taking of what has been said before. To support this, he brought in the case of Turkey where the caliphate was legislatively worked out from a personal institution into a collective one, which he admitted to be ijtihad. Iqbal extolled this as a big step, proving that ijtihad continues to be alive and necessary for reform in modern Islamic governance. [3]

The decline of the Muslim world from a status of remarkable intellectual and political leadership to a fragmentation into disorientation and confusion was closely related to the loss of visionary leadership. From the time of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and his companions, the Ummah prospered under the guidance of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and then the scholars who upheld Islamic jurisprudence and governance. The extinction of these leaders and scholars led to the idea that in the same way true scholars were disappearing, so too were those qualified mujtahids’ capable of independent legal reasoning. Such an analogy, over time, contributed to the general assumption that later generations had little ability or the authentication to perform ijtihad; hence arose the assertion that the “gates of ijtihad” closed for good. [4]

Some scholars linked the decline of true mujtahids to prophetic traditions warning of knowledge (ilm) fading as the Day of Judgment nears. They viewed the scarcity of scholars capable of independent reasoning as a sign of this prophecy, reinforcing the belief that later generations lacked the expertise to continue ijtihad, leading to its closure.[5]

Ijtihad did not come to an abrupt end but rather became increasingly restricted over time. Hallaq highlights that while independent jurists (Mujtahid mutlaq) became rare, jurists within established schools (Mujtahid fi al-madhhab) continued interpreting and applying legal principles within doctrinal boundaries (p. 18, 22). However, these anti-craft movements and strong political personalities based on ijtihad received, in turn, no cordial treatment from scholars, who began viewing ijtihad with skepticism for things it could influence at the service of some interests. Thus, legal discourses became rigid, with an unqualified acceptance of the position that all fundamental legal questions had been settled. It slowly rose to degenerate thinking, wherein, in the future, instead of obtaining fresh interpretations, scholars became only able to explain and apply previous doctrines. [6]

Evolution of Ijtihad in the Modern World

The evolution of ijtihad was shaped by historical and political developments rather than a formal decree prohibiting it. As legal schools became more structured and state authorities exerted greater influence over religious institutions, scholars prioritized legal continuity over frequent reinterpretation. This shift occurred over time rather than suddenly, with scholars emphasizing adherence to established doctrines. Instead of being entirely abandoned, ijtihad was gradually confined within specific jurisprudential frameworks, making it a more regulated and restricted process rather than an openly practiced form of independent reasoning.

Hallaq rejects the notion that Islamic legal scholarship ceased to evolve because of the so-called “closure” of ijtihad. He argues, instead, for the continuity and evolution of legal reasoning by the scholars as they attempted to amend active rulings concerning emerging needs within the society. This adaptive causational response can be found in the legal system of the Ottoman Empire by the fact that some principles of Islamic law that were incorporated into the current legal order within the (19th-century codification of Hanafi jurisprudence) show a continuing engagement with juristic reasoning instead of a stagnant halt.

Likewise, in the Indian subcontinent, Shah Waliullah (1703–1762) called for a reinterpretation of Islamic teachings in light of contemporary conditions. His work on reconciling different schools of thought, one of which presented an issue of governance and several associated with social reform, showed that ijtihad was still operative within an otherwise structured framework.[7]

Furthermore, modern legal systems in Muslim-majority countries continue to showcase substantive juristic adaptation. For instance, Egypt’s Personal Status Laws incorporate classical Islamic rulings while accommodating contemporary family and gender dynamics, affirming the argument set forth by Hallaq in that perhaps they did hold onto doctrines. Yet, discourses did furnish alluding for their reinterpretation when confronted with new challenges like polygamy and granting women security and an escape from unfair and unjust situations, thus ensuring Islamic law relevance through the ages. [8]

In conclusion, rather than vanishing entirely, ijtihad became increasingly restricted and subject to cautious acceptance, reflecting a broader concern over the diminishing depth of ‘ilm’ among scholars. While historical and political developments contributed to a more rigid approach, this did not signify the complete extinction of juristic reasoning. Academics have advanced into a more richly nuanced interpretation based on existing structures to maintain Islamic law in practice against contemporary challenges. As it is today, ijtihad continues formally. However, some might think in a more cautious and structured form in legal reforms and policy changes. At the same time, they also engage in serious thinking or scholarly dialogue as to modern issues. As law, politics, and society evolve, the need for Islamic guidance on new and complex matters and problems continues to breed urgency. In such a reality, ijtihad, though careful and at times sluggish, finds its place in the interstice, providing Islamic jurisprudence the opportunity to respond to new problems while remaining faithful to fundamental principles.

REFERENCES:

[1] Anas bin Malik said: “I heard the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) say: ‘My nation will not unite on misguidance, so if you see them differing, follow the great majority.’”-Sunan Ibn Majah 3950, Book 36, Hadith 25.

[2] Joseph Schacht, ‘An introduction to Islamic law’ page 69-7

[3] Iqbal, M.: Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. 2nd edition, Ashraf Printing Press, Lahore, Pakistan, pages 178, 1982.

[4] Imam Al-Juwayni, Ghiyath al-Umam fī iltiyāth al-ẓulam

[5] Juwayni, al-Burhan, II 1348.

[6] Hallaq, W.B., ‘Was the gate of ijtihad closed?’ (Journal of Middle East Studies) volume 16, number 1, pages 3–41, 1984.

[7] Jalbani, G.N.: Teaching of Shah Waliyullah of Delhi. 2nd edition, page 199 (1967)

[8] Personal status laws in Egypt: faq, Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Institute of Research for Development (IRD) Cairo, March 2010