Case Title
Mehran v. Ubaid Ullah
Citation
PLD 2024 SC 843
Court
Supreme Court
Date of Judgment
29 May 2024
Judges Present
Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Muhammad Ali Mazhar, and Athar Minallah
Author Judge
Syed Mansoor Ali Shah
Parties
Petitioner: Mehran
Respondent: Ubaid Ullah and others
Brief Facts
The petitioner, a juvenile, was accused in FIR No. 417/2021 (Police Station Prang, District Charsadda) of offences under Sections 302, 324, 392, 427, 201 and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and Section 15 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act, 2013.
According to the FIR, on the night of 16 August 2021 the complainant, Ubaid Ullah, and the deceased, Shafiq Ur Rehman, were travelling on the motorway when the petitioner and co-accused signalled them to stop. The deceased, who was driving, did not stop. The petitioner and co-accused then opened fire, fatally wounding the deceased.
The petitioner was arrested on 23 February 2023. His initial bail petition was dismissed on merits by both the trial court and the High Court. On 18 September 2023, the petitioner moved an application seeking a determination of his juvenility. The trial court declared the petitioner a juvenile, relying on his secondary school certificate and a medical board report. His age was established as 14 years and 5 months at the time of the offense.
Afterwards, the petitioner moved a second bail petition on the statutory ground of trial delay. This petition was dismissed by the trial court on 22 January 2024, and subsequently by the High Court on 25 March 2024.
Decision of High Court
The High Court dismissed the bail petition based on the following reasons:
Core Legal Issues Before the Supreme Court
Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court held that the bail based on the statutory ground of delay under Section 6(5) is available as a matter of right to juveniles detained for heinous offenses. The “heinous” nature of a crime is the actual precondition for applying Section 6(5), not a legal bar to its application. The Court relied on Khawar Kayani v. State (PLD 2022 SC 551) to affirm that the nature of the offense is not a valid ground to withhold bail.
Furthermore, it was held that the initial duty to determine a juvenile’s age rests with the police, not the accused. If the police fail in this duty, the time a court takes to determine age is classified as an “act of the court” and cannot be attributed to the juvenile. And, delays caused by an absent co-accused cannot be blamed on the petitioner, as individuals are legally responsible only for their own actions or omissions. The Court cited Himesh Khan v. NAB (2015 SCMR 1092) and Khursheed Shah v. State (PLD 2022 SC 261) to reinforce that delays caused by a co-accused cannot be legally attributed to the petitioner.
Significance
The Supreme Court declared that the juvenile justice system is fundamentally designed to be rehabilitative and restorative rather than retributive. The Court explicitly anchored its reasoning in “Therapeutic Jurisprudence,” defining it as an interdisciplinary perspective where the law functions as a therapeutic agent to promote psychological and physical well-being. The Court viewed the law itself as a potential therapeutic agent.
By interpreting the JJSA 2018 progressively and expansively, the Court solidified the constitutional mandate (under Articles 9, 10A, 14, 25(3), and 35) and international obligations (UNCRC) to protect the liberty, fair trial rights, and dignity of children in conflict with the law.